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ABSTRACT 
 
The general perspective in reputational scholarship is that all aspects of reputation matter. 
Longitudinal data on human and financial resource mobilization in 94 entrepreneurial companies 
after investment relationship formation with venture capital investors indicate that different 
aspects of investment partner reputation matter for subsequent resource mobilization from 
different parties. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The lack of established working relationships, social approval, tested routines and the 
resulting high risk of failure make resource mobilization a key challenge and a process fraught 
with difficulties, especially within young and small entrepreneurial companies (Stinchcombe, 
1965; Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Interorganizational relationships with more established firms 
have become an attractive way to obtain resources (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). This 
study focuses on investment relationships formed between venture capital firms and 
entrepreneurial companies. These are typically one of the earliest and most critical relationships 
formed by young companies with high growth potential requiring quick access to a variety of 
resources (Hallen, 2008). Investment relationships with venture capitalists not only allow access 
to vital resources, but also act as powerful signals that communicate the quality of 
entrepreneurial companies to external markets, which is expected to facilitate subsequent 
resource mobilization (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Stuart, 2000; Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 
2003; Janney & Folta, 2003). Not all investment partners are equally valuable, however, and 
especially the most reputable investment partners will provide the strongest signals of company 
quality to external markets (Stuart et al., 1999; Janney & Folta, 2006; Hallen, 2008).  
A critical question is who these most reputable partners are, as reputation involves a 
different array of dimensions (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & 
Sever, 2005; Rhee & Valdez, 2009). We draw on recent reputation research, which indicates that 
reputation can be conceptualized as comprising two distinct dimensions (Rindova et al., 2005). 
One dimension reflects the degree to which stakeholders evaluate a firm positively on specific 
attributes, such as its expected ability based on past experience (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988; Hsu, 
2004; Janney & Folta, 2006). The second dimension concerns firm prominence or the collective 
awareness and recognition gained by a firm through social influence in its organizational field 
(Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). We study how these 
different components of reputation matter for resource mobilization in entrepreneurial 
companies.  
More significantly, the implicit assumption in most research has been that different types 
of resource providers interpret signals in the same way. Empirical studies have often focused on 
the mobilization of one particular resource (Stuart et al., 1999; Davila et al., 2003; Janney & 
Folta, 2003). We focus on the mobilization of two critical resources, namely human and financial 
resources. Entrepreneurial companies with high growth ambitions need to mobilize resources 
from multiple stakeholder groups which exhibit fundamentally different characteristics. The 
characteristics of the stakeholder groups may influence signal interpretation and hence different 
types of stakeholders may interpret the same signal differently (Heil & Robertson, 1991). This 
implies that different types of stakeholders may focus on different dimensions of investment 
partner reputation (Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Our study is one of the first empirical studies 
illuminating how distinct dimensions of reputation are attended to by different types of 
stakeholders. This is of significant theoretical interest and may inform reputation researchers on 
the fundamental question whether companies have one or multiple reputations (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Rindova et al., 2005). 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 A first dimension of reputation focuses on how stakeholders evaluate a firm positively 
based on previous actions and strategic decisions (Rindova et al., 2005). In accord with this 
definition of reputation, Hsu (2004) indicates that within the venture capital context reputation is 
primarily based on previous investment experience. More in particular, the accumulated 
experience within an industrial sector is expected to serve as a powerful contributor to venture 
capital firm reputation (Hsu, 2004; Janney & Folta, 2006). There are several reasons why 
stakeholders will perceive venture capital firms with more relevant investment experience as 
more capable. The experience of investment partners is likely to influence both their ability to 
select the most promising companies and to influence company development after the initial 
investment through the provision of superior value added services (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; 
Dimov & De Clercq, 2006; Sorensen, 2007). So when companies are able to affiliate with more 
experienced investment partners this is expected to decrease the uncertainty characterizing 
entrepreneurial companies which in turn is expected to increase the willingness of outsiders to 
contribute resources (Janney & Folta, 2006). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The industry-specific experience of the initial venture capital investor will 
allow companies to mobilize more resources over time. 
 
A second dimension of reputation is prominence and focuses on how well-known a firm 
is within its organizational field (Rindova et al., 2005). When entrepreneurial companies affiliate 
with well-known investment partners this is likely to have at least two effects. First, it will draw 
attention to entrepreneurial companies. Once resource providers have learned about the existence 
of companies, because they affiliate with well-known partners in the entrepreneurship 
community, companies are more likely to become part of the “consideration set” of resource 
providers (Merton, 1987; Jensen & Roy, 2008). This is important as potential resource providers 
are only likely to transact with and contribute resources to companies they have at least heard of 
(Merton, 1987). 
Second, prominent venture capital firms are expected to have access to many investment 
opportunities. This is because entrepreneurs need to put their companies forward as candidates 
for receiving finance before investors can select the companies in which they will invest 
(Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006). Well-known investors are likely to receive many investment 
proposals because of their visibility. Nevertheless, venture capital firms only decide to invest in 
few companies each year. Hence, the mere fact that entrepreneurial companies are able to raise 
finance from prominent investors will offer quality signals to resources providers (Stuart et al., 
1999). This should make resource providers even more likely to transact with companies. The 
above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. The prominence of the initial venture capital investor will allow companies 
to mobilize more resources over time. 
 
In line with the general perspective in reputational scholarship the above hypotheses 
indicate that all aspects of reputation are important. It is assumed that partner experience and 
partner prominence will benefit resource mobilization in entrepreneurial companies and this 
irrespective of the type of stakeholder from which resources are mobilized. Hence, all 
stakeholders interpret signals in the same way. In this paper, we propose that that different 
aspects of reputation have varying degrees of importance to different stakeholders, depending 
upon their knowledge of the organizational field in which the venture capital investor operates.  
Prospective investors are a good example of stakeholders that will have deep knowledge 
about the venture capital industry, including the past actions of their peers and the companies in 
which they invested. The expected ability of an initial venture capital firm based on previous 
investment experience may be relatively easy to assess for other investors. Moreover, 
prospective investors are likely to recognize that the previous relevant investment experience of 
the initial investors is critical for the subsequent development of entrepreneurial companies. 
After all, the initial lead investor plays a key role in venture development through its presence in 
the board of directors (Lerner, 1995) and the contribution of knowledge-based resources 
(Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). However, initial investors may not only facilitate, but 
also hamper portfolio company development, for instance, by offering the wrong strategic 
recommendations or by imposing misguided constraints (Steier & Greenwood, 1995). Potential 
investors perceive these risks as more limited when investors have accumulated relevant 
experience through previous investments in similar companies (Baeyens, Vanacker, & Manigart, 
2006). Hence, although new investors will almost always conduct their own extensive due 
diligence their investment decision is likely to be influenced by the industry-specific experience 
of the initial investor.  
Not all stakeholders will have deep knowledge on the venture capital industry. Prior 
research demonstrates how entrepreneurs of technology-based companies generally have limited 
knowledge on how venture capital firms operate (Van Auken, 2001). It is reasonable to expect 
the average employee within an entrepreneurial company will experience the same problems. 
Employees are a good example of stakeholders that will have less knowledge on the venture 
capital industry. Due to their lack of knowledge, employees are expected to experience 
significant problems in assessing the quality of venture capital firms based on the previous 
experience of the latter. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The industry-specific experience of the initial venture capital investor will 
be more important for companies to mobilize resources from investors compared to 
employees. 
 
 While stakeholders with less knowledge on specific partners are expected to experience 
difficulties in assessing partner quality based on previous experiences, they may still rely on 
other signals to reduce uncertainty. One potential alternative is to focus on partner prominence, 
which by definition is easier to observe. When entrepreneurs team up with venture capital firms 
that are highly visible this will not only draw attention to the company (Jensen & Roy, 2008), but 
may also influence the perception about company quality (Stuart et al., 1999). As such, the 
prominence of the initial lead investor may influence the decision of employees to join uncertain 
entrepreneurial companies. However, the effect of prominence may be less important when 
stakeholders already have deep knowledge on who their peers are and to which companies they 
have previously contributed resources. Wang (2009), for instance, demonstrates that venture 
capital investors are unlikely to invest in companies only because these companies have been 
introduced to them by a known source. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4. The prominence of the initial venture capital investor will be more 
important for companies to mobilize resources from employees compared to investors.  
 
METHOD 
 
Data Sources 
 
We use a database provided by the Belgian Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (B.V.A.) which relates venture capital backed companies to their lead investors. The 
dataset comprises 94 companies that received initial venture capital finance between 1999 and 
2003. This is a random sample of about one third of the total number of initial investments by 
B.V.A. members over the timeframe of the study. Only initial investments conducted before the 
end of 2003 are included in order to have sufficient data to track resource mobilization in 
companies selected at the end of this timeframe. The dataset includes companies that eventually 
fail and hence results are not subject to survivorship bias. 
Detailed yearly financial statement data is collected for each portfolio company from the 
year of initial venture capital investment up to five years after this investment. We hence 
construct a six-wave longitudinal dataset comprising 520 firm year observations. An important 
advantage of the Belgian setting is that all limited liability companies are required to file 
financial statements with the Belgian Central Bank. In order to collect data on the lead venture 
capital firm providing initial venture capital finance, multiple sources of data are used, including 
Zephyr, the B.V.A. database and trade directories. The lead venture capital firms providing 
initial finance range from small venture capital firms with only six million euro of assets under 
management to venture capital firms with more than one billion euro of assets under 
management. 
 
Measures 
 
We study the mobilization of human and financial resources from the year of investment 
relationship formation up to five years after the initial venture capital investment.  Human 
resources reflect the number of employees in full time equivalents. Financial resources are 
operationalized as the amount of equity and financial debt outstanding. The mobilization of more 
resources is likely to be critical, as companies, which accumulate more resources early on, are 
likely to develop a sustainable competitive advantage over their resource-constrained peers (Lee, 
Lee, & Pennings, 2001).  
The key independent variables are correlates of venture capital firm experience and 
prominence measured at the year of the initial investment. Venture capital firm industry-specific 
experience is operationalized as the total number of investments made by the venture capital firm 
in the same industry (2-digit industry code)  as the focal company before investing in this 
company (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Sharfstein, 2008). It represents cumulative industry 
experience and relates to the concept of venture capital firm reputation as perceived quality 
based on previous experience (Hsu, 2004; Janney & Folta, 2006). The natural logarithm of 
industry experience is used as the value of each additional amount of investment experience is 
expected to be subject to decreasing returns (Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994). 
Venture capital firm prominence is operationalized as the total number of media citations 
to particular venture capital firms in Belgian national newspapers in the period 1995 until the 
year of investment. The media presents stakeholders with information that affects the 
legitimization of firms (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). We construct a simple count measure of 
media attention and do not attempt to categorize coverage as “good” or “bad”. Cook, Kieschnick 
and Van Ness (2006), for instance, demonstrate how the media provides non-negative descriptive 
stories in over 99% of the articles they scrutinized in more detail. The natural logarithm of media 
citations is used in subsequent analyses. 
We control of year and industry effects, company age at the time of the initial investment, 
company growth potential (proxied by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets), the amount of 
initial finance provided by the initial venture capital investors, syndication (the number of 
investors providing initial finance), venture capital investor type, venture capital investor size at 
the time of the initial investment (natural logarithm of capital under management) and venture 
capital investor age at the time of the initial investment. 
 
Model 
 
Random Coefficient Modeling (RCM) also referred to as mixed modeling or growth 
modeling is used as an appropriate longitudinal technique to study changes in the amount of 
human and financial resources mobilized over time. Many of the standard statistical techniques 
are not appropriate to use when data consist of repeated measures that are correlated within 
companies as this invalidates the basic assumption of independence. In order to deal with 
longitudinal data, scholars have often used general multivariate regressions models that require 
longitudinal data where all companies have the same number of repeated measures, taken at time 
points, which are also the same for all companies (Fitzmaurice, Laird, & Ware, 2004). These 
strict assumptions are rarely fulfilled in longitudinal studies and are not required when using a 
RCM framework (Fitzmaurice et al, 2004). Moreover, the RCM framework allows modeling 
non-linear change and accounts for both individual differences between companies as well as 
similarities among groups of companies (Fitzmaurice et al., 2004). The RCM framework is 
gaining increasing attention by organizational scholars and recent applications in the 
organizational literature are available (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Hausknecht, Hiller, & Vance, 
2008). 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Results demonstrate the multidimensional nature of reputation and how different 
stakeholders are likely to focus on different dimensions of partner reputation before they 
contribute resources to uncertain entrepreneurial companies. While venture capital firm 
prominence is particularly important for portfolio companies to mobilize human resources, we 
fail to find an effect of the industry-specific experience of venture capital firms on the 
mobilization of human resources. Results are very different when we focus on the mobilization 
of financial resources. Here venture capital firm industry-specific experience plays a particularly 
important role, but we fail to find an effect of venture capital firm prominence on the 
mobilization of financial resources in portfolio companies. These results provides support for 
hypothesis 3 and 4. 
A particular concern is self-selection which may bias our findings. Specifically, more 
reputable venture capital firms may select companies with higher growth potential or 
alternatively the most promising entrepreneurial companies may select the most reputable 
venture capital investors (Eckhardt et al., 2006; Sorensen, 2007). Failure to account for selection 
(possibly on unobservable characteristics) may lead to incorrect inferences with respect to the 
impact of venture capital firm reputation on company growth (Sorensen, 2007). However, we 
demonstrate how entrepreneurial companies backed by more reputable investors (both in terms 
of previous investment experience and prominence) do not exhibit higher growth in the years 
preceding the initial venture capital investor compared to companies backed by less reputable 
investors. Moreover, we ran selection models (including variables similar to Hsu (2004) such as 
the number of patents applied for before initial venture capital investment) and included inverse 
mills ratios in our models which did not alter our main conclusions. Overall, we provide 
consistent evidence that while self-selection is likely to occur, it is unlikely to fully explain the 
relationships between the different dimensions of investor reputation and resource mobilization 
in entrepreneurial companies. 
 The study makes several important contributions to reputation research. First, this is one 
of the first studies to address the impact of distinct dimensions of reputation on the mobilization 
of resources in entrepreneurial companies. Prior studies have focused on the impact of different 
dimensions of firm reputation on the ability of firms to demand a premium in order to affiliate 
with them (Rindova et al., 2005). The perspective in this study is different in that it focuses on 
the impact of partner reputation on the development of companies that affiliate with more or less 
reputable firms. Such a perspective is important as prior research indicates that accessing 
reputation is not for free (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Hsu, 2004). 
 Second, this study addresses a long-standing debate in the reputation literature relating to 
the question whether a company has only one or multiple reputations (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Rindova et al, 2005; Rhee & Valdez, 2009). We demonstrate that reputation comprises 
distinct dimensions and that these different dimensions are attended to by different stakeholders. 
Results demonstrate how in the current research context partner experience is particularly 
important to mobilize financial resources while prominence is important to mobilize human 
resources. Nevertheless, experience and prominence are not fully orthogonal (Rindova et al., 
2005) and hence partners may score high on the two dimensions. Overall, the results demonstrate 
a clear need to be explicit about the question from whose perspective reputation is studied. 
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